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SALES-SIMULATION-RIGHT OF FORCED HEIRS TO BRING ACTION
AFTER PROPERTY HAS PASSED INTO THE HANDS OF THIRD PARTIES-
The plaintiff's ancestor executed three simulated sales of im-
movable property which was subsequently transferred to third
parties. On the death of the original vendor this action was
brought by the forced heirs to recover title to the land and for
an accounting of minerals extracted therefrom. Held, that the
defendants, third possessors, could not be affected by any equities
existing in favor of the plaintiffs dehors the public records. Chief
Justice O'Niell concurred on the ground that the prescription of
ten years was a sufficient defense, leaving open the question
whether, in the absence of prescription, the doctrine of McDuffle
v. Walker' founded on Article 22662 was applicable to a suit by
forced heirs seeking to annul the simulated sale of their ancestor.
Chachere v. Superior Oil Co., 192 La. 193, 187 So. 321 (1939).
It is well settled that every transfer of immovable property
must be in writing,' either by authentic act or under private sig-
nature; 4 and that parol evidence is inadmissable to contradict
what is contained in the act of sale.5 This rule has two well estab-
lished qualifications: (1) verbal sales can be proved by interrog-
atories on oath when actual delivery of the immovable has been
made," and (2) simulated sales can be proved by means of coun-
ter letters.7 In justification of the former it has been reasoned
that answers to interrogatories are not "parol proof" but rather
a part of the written evidence of the title.8 As to counter letters
their use is authorized by Article 2239" which is based on the idea
that a counter letter does not give rise to two successive agree-
ments by which one logically succeeds the other; but rather, that
there is such a connection between the one and other than the
1. 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1910).
2. La. Civil Code of 1870.
3. Art. 2275, La. Civil Code of 1870.
4. Art. 2440, La. Civil Code of 1870.
5. Art. 2276, La. Civil Code of 1870; Raper's Heirs v. Yocum, 3 Mart. (O.S.)
424 (La. 1814); Ruddock Orleans Cypress Co. v. Chas. de Luppe, 4 Orl. App.
306 (La. App. 1907); Dance v. Craighead, 134 La. 6, 63 So. 604 (1913); Loranger
v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 162 La. 1054, 111 So. 418 (1927); Lindner v. Cotonio,
175 La. 352, 143 So. 286 (1932); Soule v. West, 185 La. 655, 170 So. 26 (1936).
6. Art. 2275, La. Civil Code of 1870; Bach v. Hall, 3 La. 116 (1831); Marin-
neaux v. Edwards, 4 La. Ann. 103 (1849); Locascio v. First State Bank &
Trust Co., 168 La. 723, 123 So. 304 (1929).
7. Art. 2239, La. Civil Code of 1870; Palmes v. Kuhn, 46 La. Ann. 906,
15 So. 167 (1894); State v. Recorder of Mortgages, 175 La. 94, 143 So. 15 (1932).
8. McKerall v. McMillan, 9 Rob. 19 (La. 1844); Semere v. Semere, 10 La.
Ann. 704 (1855).
9. La. Civil Code of 1870.
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two acts must be considered as indivisible.10 This theory is in
line with the whole tenor of the Civil Code dealing with proof
of obligations.1
The parol-evidence rules mentioned above, however, are not
applicable when forced heirs are seeking to set aside the simu-
lated sales of those from whom they inherit. They are given
the right to annul such contracts "absolutely and by parol
evidence."1 2 The majority opinion stands for the proposition that
forced heirs do not have this right after the property has passed
into the hands of third parties who bought relying on the public
records. Whether this proposition is sound is the question posed
by the concurring opinion.
The court has consistently held, since the case of McDuffie
v. Walker, that persons dealing with immovable property have
the right to depend on the faith of the recorded title and they
are not bound by any equities that may exist between their own
vendor and prior owners of the land.18 This interpretation of
Article 2266 harmonizes with the first part of Article 2239, which
renders Article 2239 unnecessary in so far as immovables are
concerned. The title holder will usually record his title in order
to maintain himself as the record holder; but not the holder of
the counter letter who may be interested in keeping the trans-
action secret. Since the unrecorded document can have no effect
against the one recorded, the third party does not have to depend
on Article 2239 to protect his title but he can rely wholly on
Article 2266. However, the latter part of Article 2239,14 which
gives forced heirs the right to attack simulations, suggests a pos-
sible conflict with Article 2266 as that article has been interpreted
in McDuffle v. Walker. That case does not recognize an exception
in favor of forced heirs attacking a transfer made by the ancestor,
but it makes reliance upon the recorded title the sole test.
Whether such an exception should be permitted depends upon
considerations of social policy.
The doctrine of forced heirship in Louisiana is based on the
idea that a person who has been brought up to a certain way of
10. 29 Demolombe, Cours de Code Napoleon (1876) 274, no 309.
11. Arts. 2233, 2235, 2239, 2256, 2266, 2275, 2276, La. Civil Code of 1870.
12. Art. 2239, La. Civil Code of 1870.
13. State v. Recorder of Mortgages, 175 La. 94, 143 So. 15 (1932); Masters
v. Cleveland, 182 La. 483, 162 So. 51 (1935); Hunter v. Forrest, 183 La. 434,
164 So. 163 (1935). See Gautreaux v. Harang, 190 La. 1060, 1098, 183 So. 349,
361 (1938).
14. The latter part of Article 2239 came into the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870 by virtue of Act 5 of 1884. Prior to that time only what is now the first
part, down to the second semicolon, comprised the article. This was the same
as Article 2236 of the Civil Code of 1825.
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life should not suddenly be cast out to become a burden on
society.15 To effectuate this idea a forced heir is given a number
of rights. One of these concerns the 1gitime,"6 to protect which
the forced heir is given, among other remedies, the action of
revendication17 and the action en declaration de simulation.8 By
the former a donation of immovables can be recovered by forced
heirs to the extent that it prejudices their 16gitime even though
the property has passed into the hands of third parties.19 This is
because third parties take with notice that the property is a dona-
tion and is subject to the rights of forced heirs.20 By the action
en declaration de simulation forced heirs are given the right to
recover property transferred by a simulated sale of the ancestor.
The Civil Code, prior to the amendment of Article 2239 by Act 5
of 1884, contained no provision whereby forced heirs could, even
up to their lgitime, recover property subject to the simulated
sales of their ancestor; consequently, this right of action was
worked out by the jurisprudence. 21 For that reason, no cases were
found in which the action was brought against a third party
purchaser in good faith. This left forced heirs without a remedy
when the simulated vendee conveyed to a third party. At the
present time, can Article 2239, as amended, be considered as
having extended this action to cases where the property had
passed into the hands of third parties so as to give greater pro-
tection to the forced heir? In support of this view there are the
considerations expressed above coupled with the fact that an
15. 19 Demolombe, op. cit. supra note 10, at 4-5, nos 1-2.
16. Arts. 1493, 1494, 1495, La. Civil Code of 1870.
17. Art. 1517, La. Civil Code of 1870.
18. Louis v. Richard, 12 La. Ann. 684 (1856); Collins v. Pratt, 15 La. Ann.
42 (1860); Jones v. Jones, 119 La. 677, 44 So. 429 (1907); Weydert v. Ander-
son, 157 La. 577, 102 So. 676 (1925).
19. Carroll v. Cockerham, 38 La. Ann. 813 (1886); Tessier v. Roussel, 41
La. Ann. 474, 6 So. 824 (1889); Cox v. Von Ahlefeldt, 50 La. Ann. 1266, 23 So.
959 (1898).
20. The third party is amply protected: (1) the fact that the vendee
acquired by means of a donation appears on the face of the title, (2) Article
1517 provides that the property cannot be proceeded against until the prop-
erty of the donee has first been discussed, and (3) by virtue of Article 1518
a third party possessor cannot be proceeded against until all subsequent
donations and all legacies have been brought into the mass.
21. Croizet's Heirs v. Gaudet, 6 Mart. (O.S.) 524 (La. 1819); Prudence v.
Bermodi, 1 La. 234 (1830); Rachal v. Rachal, 4 La. Ann. 500 (1849); Maples
v. Mitty, 12 La. Ann. 759 (1857); Guilbeau v. Thibodeaux, 30 La. Ann. 1099
(1878). A simulation is different from a donation in that it is considered
void and of no effect ab initio. Consequently it can be attacked by creditors
and other interested third parties. Due to the specific prohibitions of Article
2239, in the absence of a counter letter, this right is denied the transferor.
It is also denied the heirs and assigns because of Article 2236. As to how




heir has no right to bring an action until he comes into the in-
heritance. 22 Frequently many years elapse from the time of the
simulation to the death of the ancestor. If this view be taken then
the latter part of Article 2239 must be considered an exception to
Article 2266 as interpreted by McDuffie v. Walker and subsequent
cases. 8
However, Article 2239 is susceptible of another interpretation
in which the interest of third parties is the dominant factor and
by which the article can be harmonized with Article 2266. A strict
reading of Article 2239 shows that the right of forced heirs to
attack simulated contracts is applicable only to the "simulated
contracts of those from whom they inherit. ' 24 Since the contract
between the original vendee and the third party is not such a
contract and since there is no privity whatsoever between forced
heirs and third parties it can be argued that Article 2239 gives
the heir no right of action against the latter. In addition, the last
part of Article 2239, which was added by the amendment of 1884,
is open to the interpretation that it had for its purpose the en-
largement of a prior right and not the creation of a new one. It
was early settled that forced heirs could attack the simulated
sales of their ancestor. 25 But this right could not be exercised
unless the lgitime was impaired.2 6 It therefore appears that Act
5 of 1884 was passed with the intention of sweeping away this
restriction so as to give forced heirs a right of action not limited
to the l6gitime. 27
Under either of the foregoing interpretations Article 2239
would be harmonized with Article 2266. Although these consider-
ations were not discussed by the principal case the court might
have had them in mind when it applied the rule of McDuffie v.
Walker. It is submitted that there is no justification for the doubt
expressed in the concurring opinion. C. A. G.
22. Art. 15, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Arts. 899, 978, La. Civil Code of
1870; Succession of Ludewig, 3 Rob. 99 (La. 1842); Cox v. Von Ahlefeldt, 105
La. 543, 30 So. 175 (1900).
23. Sorrel v. Hardy, 127 La. 843, 54 So. 122 (1911); Breaux v. Roger, 129
La. 894, 57 So. 164 (1912); Schneidau v. New Orleans Land Co., 132 La. 264,
61 So. 225 (1913); Goldsmith v. McCoy, 190 La. 320, 182 So. 519 (1938).
24. Art. 2239, La. Civil Code of 1870.
25. Croizet's Heirs v. Gaudet, 6 Mart. (O.S.) 524 (La. 1819).
26. See cases cited in note 21, supra.
27. Spencer v. Lewis, 39 La. Ann. 316, 1 So. 671 (1887); Wells v. Goss, 110
La. 347, 34 So. 470 (1903). In the last cited case the idea is expressed that the
only change brought about by Act 5 of 1884 was to widen the door with
regard to the testimony to be adduced in behalf of parties bearing such
relation to the deceased as to fall under the classification of forced heirs.
With respect to the last word of Article 2239 it should be noted that the
legislature obviously meant "lgitime" and not "legitimate."
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